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Two Ideas To Increase Innovation And Reduce
Pharmaceutical Costs And Prices
What policy proposals can be made to best increase current
consumer welfare while maintaining or increasing incentives to
innovate?
by Arjun Jayadev and Joseph Stiglitz
ABSTRACT: The pharmaceutical industry is undergoing a period of uncertainty. Profits are
being squeezed by increasing costs and competitive pressures, and new drug production is
slowing down. This Perspective reviews two policies that could assist in realigning incen-
tives toward genuine innovation while also keeping drug spending growth under check.
Value-based pricing can incentivize genuinely new discoveries and align research and de-
velopment with social welfare. Public funding of clinical trials likewise can reduce both
pharmaceutical costs and prices and direct research effort in a manner that is more so-
cially productive than the current state of affairs. [Health Affairs 28, no. 1 (2009): w165–
w168 (published online 16 December 2008; 10.1377/hlthaff.28.1.w165)]
A
per iod of turmo il is imminent for
the pharmaceutical industry. The
pipeline of new drugs appears to be
slowing down, increased generic competition
is imminent in several key segments where
“blockbuster drugs” are concentrated, and in-
surers and payers are looking more aggres-
sively for cheaper alternatives.1 In addition,
existing pharmaceutical regulations on prices
such as price controls and reference pricing
reduce revenues to pharmaceutical compa-
nies, and there is increasing pressure to re-
duce prices through regulation in the United
States.2 This confluence of events will mean
significant changes in the industry’s struc-
ture. Further, the squeeze on profits, it is ar-
gued, could have adverse impacts by reducing
innovation incentives, and thereby could
lower worldwide access to novel treatments
in the future.
Given these facts, what policy proposals
can be made that will best increase current
consumer welfare while simultaneously main-
taining or increasing incentives to innovate?
We here proffer two proposals that should be
considered: (1) replacing existing price-
regulatory structures with a value-based ap-
proach to pricing; and (2) moving toward pub-
lic funding of clinical trials. The former can
serve to realign national regulators’ budgetary
allocations in a non-arbitrary fashion to maxi-
mize access to innovative drugs. The latter
could simultaneously direct research into
more productive areas and reduce the cost of
drug development, while having a number of
potential ancillary benefits.
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Any reward structure should balance the
(expected) marginal benefit of directing inno-
vation at a particular product with its mar-
ginal cost. From a social viewpoint, the “inno-
vative” content of a discovery should reflect
not simply whether it is nonobvious (and so el-
igible for patent protection) but whether it af-
fords significant additional clinical benefits.
(One of the weaknesses of the empirical litera-
ture is that all new chemical entities, or NCEs,
are often treated as innovations.) For example,
it is now well recognized that
there is broad substitutability
between competing brands of
statins, except at high doses.
The large market for these
drugs in the United States
and elsewhere, and the rela-
tive ease of patenting these in-
novations, means that there is
continued social inefficiency
in terms of expended research
effort as pharmaceutical com-
panies direct research into drugs that are simi-
lar to existing products. Such drugs some-
times do have some increased therapeutic
value (even “me-too” drugs may have slightly
different side effects for some patients) and
may provide an additional contribution to
consumer welfare through product competi-
tion.3 However, it would be difficult to claim
that the marginal social benefit from these
drugs equals the marginal cost of innovation.
Estimates of total research on standard drugs
suggest that these costs constitute 80 percent
of research and development (R&D) expendi-
ture.4
 Use a value-based approach to pric-
ing. Given this social inefficiency, there may be
the potential to have well-worked-out regula-
tions that aid in reducing costs to consumers
but also provide reasonable and directed in-
centives for research-based pharma. In those
countries where purchase price can be deter-
mined by government entities, linking the
price that regulators are willing to pay to a
metric of additional value will reduce incen-
tives to provide innovations of marginal bene-
fit, including “me-too” products. This has al-
ready been recognized in different contexts.
The Office of Fair Trading in the United King-
dom, for example, has proposed that the coun-
try replace profit and price controls with a
value-based approach to pricing, which would
work to relate the spending for drugs to their
incremental clinical and therapeutic value to
patients and the broader National Health Ser-
vice (NHS). Specifically, this policy involves
assessing the marginal clinical benefit of addi-
tional drugs through the impact on quality-
adjusted life-years (QALYs).5
Such a policy also has the ad-
vantage of reducing the arbi-
trariness of profit controls.
Although it will reduce in-
centives for “me-too” drugs, it
will increase incentives for
more-fundamental innova-
tions, reducing the uncer-
tainty of the ability to appro-
priate returns. Currently, a
truly innovative drug may
have its profitability destroyed by even an infe-
rior “me-too” drug from a pharmaceutical
company that does a better job of marketing.
 Public funding of clinical trials. There
are other significant problems in ensuring that
scarce research dollars are allocated in ways
that maximize social returns to innovation.
Perhaps the most significant is the growing
cost of drug development and, in particular,
the cost of clinical trials. One often-cited (but
still controversial) set of estimates suggests
that the average costs of trials is on the order of
$400 million per NCE, a large fraction of total
developmental costs.6 Accordingly, rethinking
policy for clinical trials may be one of the sim-
plest and most effective policy changes to in-
crease efficiency in drug innovation. Particu-
larly promising are proposals to publicly fund
clinical trials for pharmaceuticals. In the re-
cent past there have been several calls for an
increase in public oversight and funding of
clinical trials for prescription drugs.7 Dean
Baker’s comprehensive proposal involves fed-
eral contracting with private-sector firms,
which choose to conduct trials based on pre-
clinical results reported by innovators. (Alter-
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drug may have its
profitability
destroyed by even an
inferior ‘me-too’ drug
from a company that
does a better job of
marketing.”
natively, testing could be done in house
through the National Institutes of Health or
the Food and Drug Administration.) The costs
for these trials could be recovered as part of
the charges imposed on the sale of drugs.
Overall drug prices should be lower, as a result
of the considerable savings from implementing
such a policy.
There are two fundamental arguments in
favor of this approach: First, clinical trials
should rightly be seen as a public good. Infor-
mation flowing out of clinical
trials, once publicly available,
could improve the decision
making in R&D as pharma-
ceutical firms choose better
candidates for testing from
their libraries. This transpar-
ency might even include open
access to data, which would
be made publicly available in
the same way in which the
government promotes the
availability of census and Current Population
Survey data. Such access would obviate costly
duplicative R&D and would increase over-
sight, as anyone anywhere in the world could
evaluate the outcomes against whatever
baseline characteristics they choose.
Currently, drug companies have been push-
ing for more-restrictive use of data generated
by testing, which could reduce access to medi-
cines, especially in third-world countries. Sev-
eral recent bilateral trade agreements have
provisions on data exclusivity that act as an
extra layer of protection over and above the
patent, without clear social benefits.
Greater confidence in the quality of testing
is a second major argument in favor of public
testing. Public funding of trials can reduce
conflicts of interest, whose consequences have
been evident in several recent scandals in
which drug companies seem to have sup-
pressed relevant evidence on safety and effi-
cacy.
These conflicts of interest contribute to the
high costs of testing—and even to the high
costs of drugs. The implicit or explicit bribing
of doctors involved in clinical trials research
not only raises costs, but also reduces compe-
tition. Doctors participating in trials are more
likely to prescribe the drugs once they are cer-
tified; given the high switching costs (and the
fact that patients typically bear a small frac-
tion of the overall costs), this reduces the effec-
tive elasticity of demand. Reduced competi-
tion, in turn, results in higher prices and
greater rent-seeking expenditures (including
on advertising and marketing).
Public funding of clinical trials provides
other advantages for advanc-
ing innovation and reducing
costs. The costs of clinical tri-
als serve as a major entry bar-
rier, reducing competition
and raising prices. They also
discourage drug companies
from engaging in research in
particular products; if compa-
nies did not have to defray the
costs of clinical trials, there
would be a lower threshold of
required revenues to make R&D worthwhile.
As such, there would potentially be profitable
opportunities across a much wider range of
products. Second, with appropriate guidelines
that mandate testing against existing drugs
and encourage contracting firms to undertake
trials that improve public health, public fi-
nancing could disincentivize “me-too” drugs.
Under the current system, “me-too” drugs
whose social benefits are unlikely to match the
testing costs are tested nonetheless—all the
drug companies care about is whether they
will be able to appropriate enough of the exist-
ing market to compensate for the incremental
testing costs. But under public financing (in
which the government uses an expected value-
based approach) in which there is an arm’s-
length relationship between the contracting
firm and the pharmaceutical company, there is
little incentive for the firm to undertake such
trials.
Moreover, larger pharma firms have an im-
plicit advantage in conducting trials because
they are able to use their deep pockets to diver-
sify risk. As such, they are in an advantageous
position in relation to their biotechnology
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counterparts and other smaller firms that are
in R&D partnerships. Smaller biotech compa-
nies and others seeking to maintain control
over their innovation may be better incen-
tivized and more secure against takeover if
they are able to concentrate on innovation and
not rely on larger partners to bring their out-
put to market. The diseconomies of scope
(combining testing, innovation, and market-
ing) undermine principles of comparative ad-
vantage and are likely to overwhelm whatever
economies of scope may exist.
 Concluding comments. Given the cur-
rent state of the industry, and the general ero-
sion of trust in its innovative capacity and its
testing, different ideas will need to be consid-
ered as the sector finds alternative business
models. In general, proposals are hard to come
by. These two ideas can simultaneously serve
the multiple goals of reducing costs, reducing
prices, increasing the overall pace of innova-
tion, and directing more innovation to areas
for which social returns are highest.
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